Chuntian Academy International

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
"Sizing up opponents to assess dangers and distances is the proper course of action" (Sun Tzu)

When reforms or improvements are called for within the intelligence community, the typical area of concern is usually collection. This makes sense because, in one way, in terms of staffing, those who process raw intelligence; i.e., the "collectors," generally outnumber the smaller number of presumably smarter analysts. Resource debates between collection versus analysis are legend in intelligence work. In another sense, it might not a good idea to presume analysts are smarter than collectors, and further, it is probably a fallacy to assume (as many politicians do) that simply "having more intelligence" is all that's needed. In fact, empirical evidence shows that more information does not necessarily improve the accuracy of assessment, although it may improve certainty in assessment (Kam 1988; Khalsa 2006). An intensified collection effort will not necessarily lead to better analysis, and the reasons why involve explaining the way the intelligence cycle is supposed to work, in terms of the relationship between collection and analysis, among other things, such as the "duty" of intelligence gathering being to deal with future dangers, not punish past behaviors (Heymann 1998; Ronczkowski 2004), and as the latter cited author notes, being proactive is a must -- "in order to spawn intelligence, you need as much information as possible, for without information, you will have no intelligence. There is no such thing as a bad source, only bad information. Information equals intelligence, not the other way around. Gathering or obtaining good, clean, timely, and accurate information is key" (Ronczkowski 2004:71).

Collection produces information, not intelligence, and collection derives from requirements. Requirements are those interests, many of which are self-evident, which involve some risk or likelihood of a national security event, usually a threat or some issue of vital importance to an administration priority. With collection, it is impossible to cover everything, and not every issue requires the same collection resources, and not everything collected is of equal value (Lowenthal 2006). Collection as part of the intelligence process requires all-agency and all-source reporting, even law enforcement reporting of suspicious incidents, and that such reports be forwarded and put into some kind of central or master database. An agency can, of course, "sanitize" any report it forwards to avoid compromising sensitive sources, and there are various other things that can be done with security classifications. Also, in practice, there will likely be several databases, posing a database integration problem. Reports going into databases also have to be checked for functional integrity, which means that certain form fields need to be filled in properly.

For an issue like terrorism, Khalsa (2006) estimates that about 2500 raw, incoming, terrorism-related intelligence reports are generated every day by agencies and sources within the intelligence community. Now, one can then use Artificial Intelligence programs to sort the database, but these programs are only about 80% accurate -- the same level of accuracy that Humans have when "collectors" read through the assembled reports on a first-pass basis. For just the terrorism-related intelligence, then, you would need 84 collectors, profilers, or junior analysts (whatever you want to call them) because 1 person can only read one report every 10 minutes, and therefore, if a person works at this for 5 hours in an 8-hour day, they can only get 30 reports done daily. All this points to a critical principle regarding the function of collection: nothing ever gets put aside to be done later. All reports must be reviewed at the collection stage daily. Raw reports will then have sections highlighted by collectors before they are sent on to analysts, who may (and should) use other sources (not just their in-boxes) to create their finished assessments. Raw reports and finished assessments are all there is in intelligence production, and (this is important) the relevant raw reports can be attached to the finished assessments for submittal to those policymakers who want more than quicky-reference, pretty, color coded presentations. In this way, the policymaker is assured that what they receive is both: (a) all the intelligence community knows on a given topic; and (b) all the intelligence community needs to know on a given topic. If there is any question about either one, the solution is to be found in the way the intelligence cycle is supposed to work -- with collection feeding analysis and analysis feeding collection. It becomes common for analysts to help improve collection, and vice-versa, but the so-called "stovepipes" problem may develop as analysts tend to come to rely upon one form of collection at the expense of another. This aspect of the stovepipe problem runs counter to the kind of synergy and two-way communication which is required by the intelligence process.

TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE TO BE COLLECTED

Information is endless in terms of quantity, but is most exploitable when there is some "schema" which organizes "categories of interest" by the kinds of things which lend themselves either to patterns, series, or trends (which can be easily data analyzed) or detailed specifics like names, numbers, or addresses (which make the data amenable to link analysis). Identification is important, as one often runs into the problems of stolen identities, aliases, and false IDs in intelligence work. Accuracy in numbers is also important, as, for example, in the assessment of property value, smuggled quantities, costs of crime, as well as addresses. Suspicious incidents are a challenging category one must learn to master with greater consideration than is ordinarily given to such things. Given these challenges, then, it is no wonder that modern intelligence gathering is usually an extensive and hard-working endeavor having both an electronic and human face, and it has to be a bit overboard, shall we say, because the gathering or collection of intelligence is nothing more than stealing someone's secrets which they are closely guarding. It is done strategically, which means according to some direction, plan, or mission, and it is done competitively, which means that your opponents and allies are also most likely doing it, and it is done non-transparently, or in secret. The policymaking process which is informed by intelligence may be transparent, but the intelligence gathering or collection process rarely is disclosed. The first requirement is that your target must have something worth stealing. If they don't have anything worth stealing, then all you're doing is snooping or doing research. In business, this is known as the difference between competitive intelligence and market research. The military takes intelligence gathering rather seriously, as it is almost always collected for the purpose of assessing risks and hazards in preparation for the order of battle (IPB, or Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace). The most important thing to remember is that there is no such thing as intelligence for intelligence's sake. The whole purpose of gathering information about other's secrets and processing it into intelligence is to provide your leaders or policymakers with options to make policy more effective and efficient. There is no point in tasking, collecting, analyzing, and distributing intelligence products if there's no policy, issue, or anticipated issue on the table.

Intelligence gathering is another word for collection, and gathering takes place using open or closed sources. It may be helpful to review some definitions of intelligence, which would include the following. Intelligence is "the product resulting from the collecting and processing of information concerning actual and potential situations and conditions relating to domestic and foreign activities and to domestic and foreign or US and enemy-held areas" (Carl 1990). Intelligence is "secret knowledge of the enemy, a kind of knowledge which stands independently of the means by which it is obtained and the process by which it is distilled" (Troy 1991). The most basic intelligence process, or cycle, involves 3 steps: (1) collection; (2) analysis; and (3) synthesis. Collection will be outlined below. Analysis involves a variety of techniques to make conclusions or inferences. Synthesis normally produces a product, such as a chart, graph, table, summary, or other visual aid. The synthesis step is sometimes called fusion. There are additional steps which are worth mentioning because those are the ends to which intelligence is put: (4) policy; (5) arrest; and (6) war.

Some of the historical reasons for having steps or names for the separate processes of intelligence go back to the 6th century BC writings of Sun Tzu, who said the process consisted of four basic elements (and possibly a fifth): collection, analysis, covert action, counterintelligence, and maybe opportunity analysis. Over the years, there have been many additions to this literature on the intelligence process, and some examples would include: Kahn’s Law (O’Toole 1990): "Emphasizing the offensive tends toward a neglect of intelligence." The First Corollary = Emphasizing the defensive tends toward an emphasis of intelligence … The Second Corollary = Emphasizing the offensive tends toward an emphasis of counterintelligence … The Third Corollary = In situations of stalemate, both sides tend to emphasize intelligence equally … The Fourth Corollary = An offensive operation that acquires defensive aspects tends to increase the emphasis on intelligence. A look at the contemporary as well as ancient way the intelligence process is organized appears below:

There are five different categories of intelligence:

"Current" intelligence looks at day-to-day events
"Estimative" intelligence looks at what might happen
"Warning" intelligence gives urgent notice that something might happen
"Research" intelligence is an in-depth study of an issue
"Scientific and technical" intelligence is information on foreign technologies
There are five different collection "disciplines" of intelligence:

HUMINT: Human Intelligence; the collection and processing of raw intelligence from a clandestine agent working in the field.
IMINT: Imagery Intelligence; the collection, mapping, and interpretation of photographs from aerial units or satellites. Sometimes this speciality is also called PHOTINT.
MASINT: Measurement and Signature Intelligence; a collective term bringing together disparate elements that do not fit within the definitions of Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, or Human Intelligence. This category usually consists of acoustic intelligence; radar intelligence; nuclear radiation detection; infrared intelligence; electro-optical intelligence; radio frequency, unintentional radiation; materials, effluent, and debris sampling; and electro optical and spectro-radiometric sources. MASINT also refers to Signals or Imagery Intelligence data streams which require specialized processing. As a finished product, MASINT is used primarily to support military commanders and other users on a national or tactical scale.
OSINT: Open Source Intelligence; more than just newspaper clippings and the Internet, OSINT involves inventories of the full range of accessible, acknowledgeable, and unclassified private sector information sources. Some 80% of OSINT is not online, not available in English, and not available in the U.S. The purpose is to produce Just in Time: Just Enough intelligence, and the process involves discovery, discrimination, distillation, and delivery.
SIGINT: Signals Intelligence; consisting of 4 subfields: (1) communications intelligence (COMINT); (2) electronics signals analysis, primarily ELINT and RADINT; (3) foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (technical and intelligence information derived from the collection and processing of foreign telemetry, beaconry, and associated signals), usually abbreviated TELINT; and (4) information derived from the collection and processing of nonimagery infrared and coherent or noncoherent light signals hidden by such techniques as spectrum-spreading or frequency-hopping, usually referred to as signals conversion analysis. Sometimes, a whole lot of sophisticated technology is unnecessary because, believe it or not, 5% of the enemies of the U.S. still use Morse code. COMINT, which is a subset of SIGINT for Communications Intelligence involves the interception and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire, or other electromagnetic means, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Interception comprises search, intercept, operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptonalysis, decryption, study of plaintext the fusion of these processes and the reporting of results. Excluded from this definition are the interception and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts. COMSEC, or Communications Security, is any measure taken to deny persons information derived from the national security, or any measure taken to ensure the authenticity of a telecommunications. ELINT, which is a subset of SIGINT for Electronics Intelligence involves the collection (observation and recording) and processing for subsequent intelligence purposes of the information derived from foreign noncommunications, electromagnetic radiations, emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources.
Guidance From The Ancient Spy Master, Sun Tzu (500 BC)

Some trace the origins of spying to the time of Moses, many experts point out the contributions of the ancient spy master, Sun Tzu (500 BC) who said there were five classes of spies:
(1) Local spies - recruited agents who are inhabitants of an enemy territory
(2) Moles - recruited agents who are officials in an enemy government
(3) Double agents - recruited enemy spies who are used for your own purposes
(4) Doomed spies - spies used for deception purposes and expendable
(5) Surviving spies - spies who produce intelligence on your enemies
Sun Tzu said - "When all five kinds of spy are hard at work, none can discover the secret system, or "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the commander's most precious resource. More intimate relations ought to be maintained with your spies than with your own army. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other field should greater secrecy be preserved. Sun Tzu went on to say:
(1) Spies must possess a certain intuitive sagacity
(2) They should be managed with benevolence and straight forwardness
(3) Spies are ingenious, so make certain of the truth of their reports
(4) Be subtle, but use your spies for every kind of warfare
(5) All spies are expendable
Whether the object be to crush an enemy, storm a territory, or kill an official, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the official in question. Such assistants make up the playing field for spying because it's where your recruits and replacements come from. When the enemy's spies come to spy on you, they must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become double agents and available for our service. It is through the information brought by the double agent that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the double agent . Hence it is essential that the double agent be treated with the utmost liberality. Sun Tzu also stressed the necessity of counterintelligence. An intelligence service is a two-edged sword. It is of no use unless it can be trusted beyond any shadow of doubt, but the fact that it is trusted leaves it dangerously vulnerable to its compromise by enemy agents. An intelligence service reduces the mass of data, often contradictory, straining for a leader's attention: instead of ten versions of the nature of a problem, the leader has just one. This minimizes confusion, but it allows your enemies an easy and single target for penetration and deception.

SIMILARITIES & DIFFERENCES AMONG THE COLLECTION DISCIPLINES

Each discipline has its advantages and disadvantages, and to a degree, they are very competitive with one another in trying to create a "pipeline" to the top. Imagery (IMINT) is often graphic and compelling and easily shared, but is only a snapshot, and armed, real-time images (such as in armed Predator drones) are the cutting-edge now. Signals intelligence today is quite advanced at denying the enemy any use of their own SIGINT capabilities, but interception of communications remains as highly important (at the content analysis level) as monitoring communication for volume and traffic (COMINT). One way to distinguish between IMINT and SIGINT is to say IMINT tells you what happened and SIGINT tells you what will happen. In discussing collection, scholars (Lowenthal 2006) often refer to "pipelines" and "stovepipes" which are terms used in different senses. First, since all the technical collection disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT & MASINT) and the nontechnical (HUMINT) disciplines each have similar end-to-end processes (i.e., their own pipelines), it is expected there will be stovepipes formed from beginning to end (collection through dissemination) in other "types" of collection disciplines. Second, stovepipes may simply refer to the idea that different collection disciplines are in competition with one another, not well-coordinated at a central level, and hence produce complete, but individual and separate reports. Third, the reference may be to "stovepipes within stovepipes" where separate disciplines have separate processes within themselves that work somewhat independently of one another, the assumption being the idea that such natural competition produces an aggregate benefit. In common parlance, the stovepipes problem is often mentioned whenever one is talking about the lack of synergy among the various collection disciplines.

Military intelligence [see Lecture on Military Intelligence] usually has a far better handle on how to coordinate various collection disciplines, given, in part, because the military sometimes defines intelligence as collection, along with other meanings, such as: (1) surveillance -- the systematic observation of a targeted area or group, usually for an extended period of time; and (2) reconnaissance -- a mission to acquire information about a target, sometimes meaning a one-time endeavor.

An excellent example of collection synergy is pointed out by Lowenthal (2006) and involves the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. A human source provided information on the location where U-2 flights could be targeted over a trapezoid-shaped area bounded by four towns in western Cuba. Photo interpretation was then supplemented by Soviet colonel Oleg Penckovsky's turning over Soviet technical manuals. Imagery intelligence then provided crucial data (see famous "Star of David photo" below -- of an air defense site in Cuba, 1962, which was an unique road pattern previously seen only in the USSR). With this example, one can clearly see the beginning-to-end or pipeline nature of this particular type of collection. Some things are just visually self-evident.

However, basic intelligence gathering should also consist of collecting facts (data) and observations from open sources or clandestine sources. There, it needs to be patiently and rigorously analyzed, evaluated, compared, and integrated with other information and existing intelligence to arrive at conclusions relevant to the needs of policymakers. Trends and anomalies from the collected intelligence are processed carefully, and if the incoming intelligence seems to follow a pattern that pre-existing intelligence has indicated, this is called "connecting the dots." If there is an anomalous, sharp spike in the quantity or quality of incoming intelligence, this is called "chatter" or "noise." The key to success is that once your collection elements are deployed, the intelligence coming in from them is rapidly compared in a pre-production process called "cross-cueing" which ensures the possibility for timely dissemination of intelligence products. When basic intelligence collection products are compared to the kind of collected intelligence coming in from advanced methods (such as orbital or airborne sensors), this pre-production process is called "fusion," although the terms cross-cueing and fusion are sometimes used interchangeably. The United States operates with a multi-level intelligence community where interoperability and collaboration are important and intelligence from different collection sources can move rapidly from one collection discipline to another. Other nations, even our allies, use somewhat different ways of organizing their intelligence community with regard to collection. A few other democracies (like Australia and New Zealand) involve civilian oversight; Latin American nations generally involve their police and military more; communist nations usually have some form of party or council control; and Muslim nations exercise theocratic control. Some foreign ways of organizing are more or less multi-level and more or less centralized than the U.S. approach.

All gathered intelligence is rated for its quality and reliability, and then it is exploited. It is customary to apply a simple alpha (A-F) and numeric (1-6) system on raw data, where the alphabetical characters represent the reliability of the source (A= completely reliable, F= unknown reliability) and the numerical characters represent the accuracy of the information (1= confirmed by other sources, 6= truth cannot be judged). There are very few intelligence gathering sources with an A-1 rating. In the pre-production analysis phase, cross-cued intelligence is evaluated by what is called "analysis of competing hypotheses." Using this approach, an analyst (or group of analysts) tries to identify all plausible explanations or conclusions about an issue in an effort to select the correct (or most correct) one. There is then a simultaneous comparison of how well the available information supports each potential hypothesis. The ultimate finished product is a NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) presented to the National Security Advisor for the President that lays out the probabilities or possibilities. There are always caveats or provisos to intelligence products, and in many ways they affect the mindsets of analysts who use them, but often don't affect the policymakers. The collection fields of intelligence work have their own folklore which provides many cautions for those who produce intelligence products, and some basic truisms of that folklore, as well as some of the folklore itself, is discussed below:

Whatever you think you know is incomplete
At least some of it is wrong
You can't know which parts of what you think you know are wrong;
You can't know what you don't know
You can't know how much you don't know.
THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN ASSETS

Spies are (and should be) the basic collection platform for any well-rounded intelligence system. Much of intelligence gathering at the clandestine level is a lot like undercover police work. Like the policeman's attitude toward the "stool pidgeon" or "snitch," it's important to note that to intelligence professionals (case officers or case handlers), an "agent" is a foreign national, an informant, someone committed to treason and "spying" on his or her own country. The theory behind working undercover is that it removes any impediments to acquiring information, and allows a number of activities such as surveillance, eavesdropping, use of informants, and espionage. It typically involves an assumed identity for a defined and considerable amount of time. Undercover work allows someone to circulate in areas where they are not ordinarily welcome. The job of anyone working undercover is to "make cases," or in other words, to gather enough information to enable a successful outcome, remembering that the goal is to be a hunter, not a gatherer. The first rule of clandestine intelligence gathering is to go after the big game. You want the payoff to be big. You want the largest impact possible because you've maximized your gathering operation as dangerously as possible.

A distinction is usually made between agents who are under cover and those who are under deep cover. This is sometimes referred to as "legals v. illegals" although more common terminology distinguishes between "official" and "unofficial" cover. Official cover refers to disguishing an intelligence officer as an attache or liaison officer at an embassy or overseas post. Nonofficial cover refers to someone in deeper disguise who is acting like a businessman, journalist, tourist, or college professor on an exchange program. Those people on nonofficial cover make up what is called the "NOC list" (for NonOfficial Cover), and the NOC list is a closely guarded secret because NOCs are either high level principal agents or staff employees under a variety of covers. There is usually little to no cover working out of an embassy because everyone knows embassies are a hub of espionage. If a case officer under official cover works out of an embassy, they can expect extensive surveillance of their every move, so usually such officers restrict their recruitment activities to a third country outside where their embassy is. On the other hand, NOCs often have dual nationality, and require handling by an inside case officer, and employ covers that Rustmann (2002) distinguishes as "cover for status" (the legitimacy to live and work in a particular country) and "cover for action" (the aliases or identities which allow operations to be carried out).

Let's examine the stages of undercover work: THE EARLY STAGES -- A typical pattern is to bring someone in as the girlfriend or boyfriend of an infiltrator, and then distance themselves from that infiltrator. Once it's clear to all the parties involved that the undercover agent is single again, another undercover agent is brought in as the boyfriend or girlfriend of the first undercover agent. This allows the gathering unit to work as a team, which is better for safety. The initial targets are usually the big leaders of a group that has been infiltrated, but often the undercover operatives have to settle for going after the small fries, accumulating information and case material as they go. A supervisor or case officer usually makes the decision about whether enough important information has been accumulated to decide if and when the operation should be terminated, and a system will have usually been put in place for the operative to turn over evidence on a systematic basis or en masse at one time. THE MIDDLE STAGES -- some agents are allowed to create their own cover stories or legend, and this will depend upon the type of behavior involved (drugs, contraband, gambling, "subversive" groups, terrorism). The need may arise for false documents or computer records for such agents. This is not ordinarily done with minor cases. The need may also arise for creating various kind of setup situations in which the agent "proves" their criminality or loyalty by engaging in a staged showdown with police or a brush with the law. The staged encounter may also be an opportunity to supervise the agent. Since supervision and continued surveillance becomes more difficult as the operation progresses over time, agents are sometimes busted to give a progress report and let management know if they need more or less supervision. THE LATE STAGES -- some deep cover agents lose perspective and go native so agencies have policies in place to help avoid this. Most agencies will call someone in who has been doing this kind of work too long so that they can salvage their usefulness as a regular employee, and in fact, this is a job benefit guaranteed by civil service rights. Employees at the SIS and SES levels, of course, enjoy no such rights, and are allowed to be hired and fired at will. Danger, temptation, and paranoia play roles in the late stages, and it is always possible the person becomes a rogue agent where one of the hallmarks of this is that they arrange their own private surveillance and protection.

Recruiting Infiltrators: The smartest and safest way to steal anything is to recruit someone who can steal it for you and who never knows your true identity. This works for just about anything you want to do that's illegal and you don't want to get caught for it. One may balk at the ethical implications of this (see Lecture on Intelligence Ethics), but once someone is properly recruited, you can use them for just about anything. They can be used for sabotage, deception, covert operations, assassination, sex, just about anything. Many intelligence operations are built on lies, deception, and using people, generally foolish people. Using people generally follows a pattern:

the recruit doesn't realize what they are going to be doing

the recruiter fools them into thinking they aren't doing anything so terrible

the recruiter traps them in situations where they have no choice but to whatever they're told to do

Employees of intelligence services don't consider themselves spies; they consider themselves recruiters of spies. Sometimes, they sneak into foreign countries and do spy work themselves, but they still primarily think of themselves as case officers, supervisors, or handlers. In actual practice, there is a vast bureaucracy of people backing up the spy and their handler, or case officer. In any clandestine operation, the upper eschelon of a spy bureaucracy consists of: (1) a regional desk officer, who oversees all HUMINT operations in that region of the world; (2) watch officers, who staff a 24-hour crisis center; (3) a counterintelligence officer, who oversees clandestine meetings between officers and agents; and (4) a reports officer, who acts as a liaison between officers in the field and analysts at headquarters. The spies themselves are mostly considered traitor or fools, and fools come in an amazing variety of forms:

1. People with loose lips, careless security attitudes (inadvertent spies)
2. People fleeing the rule of their own country (defectors)
3. People looking for a source of extra income (walk-ins)
4. People who have made a plea bargain with law enforcement (undercovers)
5. People tricked, bribed, or blackmailed (recruits)
6. People caught spying against you (double agents)

Spies are usually classified as PRIMARY or ACCESS agents. A primary agent is someone with actual access to the information you need. An access agent knows somebody who is more important, and serves as a gateway or portal to others. Recruiting spies is all about deception. Case officers regularly deceive spies as much as spies deceive the people they spy on. Those who recruit and manage spies, however, must always come off as honest and sincere friends, and tell believable lies. Much of tradecraft is the pursuit of skill at lying. Here's one of the most standard deceptions:

The False Flag -- the case officer pretends to hold a nationality or be a person whom the target expects to be friendly to the target's own interests. Some examples: (1) a Chinese businessman thinks he's working for the Republic of China when he is really spying for Taiwan; (2) a student in Lima thinks he's passing documents to Cuban intelligence when it's actually the CIA.

Three resources that a recruiter will need, and plenty of it, are: money, drugs, and sex. Money is generally used to attract a recruit's attention, and sooner or later, it's all going to come down to money. Normally, the money will come from the budgets of the intelligence service; and at other times, activities will be self-financed. Drugs are generally used to service or create an addiction which is then used for blackmail purposes, if appropriate. Alcohol is the drug of choice, but anything that will build rapport and encourage talking is suitable. Sex almost never involves the case officer engaging in it with the recruit. Instead, the case officer uses prostitutes paid to pretend being innocent lovers, capitalizes on an ongoing affair, uses another recruit, or an innocent amateur.

Steps of Recruitment: There are two phases -- PHASE ONE consists of Spotting, Evaluating, and actual Recruiting. PHASE TWO consists of Testing, Training, Handling, and Terminating the recruit. SPOTTING means looking for people who have access. Handlers look for angry or desperate people in mid-level management positions. The best prospects are the ambitious and disgruntled. Secondarily, handlers look for clerks, secretaries, or "invisible" people in the organization. Often, they have personal problems or vices that can be worked as well as anger and desperation. In many cases, the case officer will have to settle for an access agent who can plant electronic surveillance devices. EVALUATION means personality profiling. The prospect should be thoroughly evaluated in order to determine their motives and mental health. A sufficient cover story is usually created at this step. A adequate cover story involves layers of deception. RECRUITING takes the form of meeting and getting to know the target. A close, personal relationship is cultivated, and trust is built. It starts with small, personal favors, an increase in rewards, and then the final step of asking someone to clearly betray their employer, government, coworker, lover, etc. Blackmail is used as a last resort if psychological ploys fail.

In the advanced second phase, TESTING means checking your informant's information against known facts. Regardless of the reasons for error, if a spy doesn't produce credible information, they should be threatened with termination at this point, or dropped as a source. Spies are also often "fluttered" at this point, which means that they are given a polygraph examination, or interrogated. TRAINING involves teaching the spy how to use specialized equipment and codes. One of the other important things the spy will want training in is escape and evasion tactics. Training should also involve coaching the person in how to spend money. HANDLING is a term short for "psychological handling" which usually involves the passing of control from yourself to another, usually superior, case officer. The handing off of spies is done for several reasons: so they don't get too close to their original recruiter; to make them feel they are getting better protection; and to make them feel they are getting promoted. Often, it has been your agency which has generated some fear, convincing the spy that their mother or other relative needs protection. Spies can be promoted all the way up to Admiral or General since it's only honorary rank. TERMINATION is always done by the agency. The most common reason given for termination is budget problems. Usually, the person is allowed to immigrate and is given a new identity, a desk job, and sometimes a pension. Other times, they are allowed to get caught or killed. It's important to break off all contacts with a terminated agent. They cannot be allowed to quit or resign.

Case officers and their spies should work up a special communications code between them. It may involve the type of clothing worn, or a series of hand signals. At a minimum, the following should be able to be communicated without words:

We need to meet so that we can talk

I have material to pass on to you

I think I am being followed

You have a tail

Everything in OK

Spies have copied, photographed, or memorized things, which they then pass on to their contacts. Most intelligence services use what are called COURIERS to handle all such exchanges and contacts. Sometimes, couriers are involved in the initial recruitment and training of a spy; and at other times, they're unrelated to the case. Professional messenger and postal services are also sometimes used. A traditional exchange is:

The Dead Drop -- The spy and their courier have arranged a place, usually a dumpster or public garbage can where material is discarded and later picked up.

Telephone conversations are always avoided, as are computerized forms of communicating over the Internet. A few Internet exceptions exist, however, as a popular form of exchange takes place not with encryption, but with postings in public bulletin boards or Usenet discussion groups. In other words, no direct computer-to-computer connections are allowed. SAFE HOUSES exist in almost every city. Most commonly, they are hotel or motel rooms; other times, a rental house or apartment. Safe houses are always constantly being rented, the purpose being that their newness prevents the planting of surveillance devices. As a general rule, spies and visitors should always be blindfolded when taken to a safe house.

There are code words, and there is a technical distinction between a code word and a nickname. A code word is usually a single, five-letter word selected from a list contained in a document known as JANAP 299 (Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Publication). A code word always is assigned a classified meaning. A nickname usually consists of two words and is assigned an unclassified meaning. TOP SECRET UMBRA, for example, indicates that information about the operation with the code word "umbra" is top secret. Employees may have a nickname for this operation like "spoke wheel" which implies that it's got something to do with transportation, and may or may not remind the employee of the cover story; in this case, the possible use of bicycle tires for something. Often, the nickname implies something the exact opposite of the real operation: SKYBORNE for an underseas operation, e.g., or WATERLOG for an space operation. Sometimes, four-letter code words are used, like GYRO, for instance. Whenever you see a four letter code word, this usually means that the information it refers to was obtained from intercepted communications by top officials from foreign countries. Other four-letter code words refer to mail openings and information obtained from foreign books. Classified documents are often labeled with all the associated code words; like TOP SECRET UMBRA GAMMA GYRO SKYBORNE WATERLOG. Each word may have a different security classification requirement. In this case, the employee would have to have the security clearance for each level. A clearance for GAMMA might not suffice for WATERLOG, e.g. This has resulted in the commonly-seen whiteout or blackout through certain sentences in reports, because the most classified material has been made unreadable. A tradecraft glossary of terms is as follows:

A Tradecraft Glossary of Terms

BLIND DATE -- A meeting between an unknown intelligence officer and an agent, usually of separate governments, at a place of one or the other's choosing.
BLOWBACK -- A deception planted abroad to mislead people in other countries, but then coming back to the originating country through public media channels, intended to deceive one's own government as well.
CLOAK AND DAGGER -- The traditional game played by spies and spy agencies, compared to the game of "cops and robbers" played by law enforcement. The word "cloak" means to hide and the term "dagger" means to kill. It technically refers to the art of making somebody disappear without a trace, but has become slang for any kind of traditional spy operation.
COUNTERxxxxxx -- 3 basic types: COUNTERespionage, which protects classified materials or agents from being "collected" by feeding the enemy false information; COUNTERintelligence, which protects people, organizations, or installations from assassination, infiltration, or sabotage as well as disrupting foreign intelligence gathering by acting on enemy plans before they can be carried out; and COUNTERmeasure, a means of countering a specific enemy threat, such as in electronic countermeasures.
COVER -- A protective guise used by a person, organization, or installation to conceal true affiliation or sponsorship. If great care is used to construct a totally false identity, this is called a LEGEND. If it's just a light cover which consists of just a business card, address, and phone number to withstand a less than thorough inquiry, this is called being BACKSTOPPED.
DEAD DROP -- An exchange of information without the two operatives meeting face to face. Notes and materials, for example, are left in an airport locker or a tree stump.
DEFECTOR -- The most common way in which spies are recruited and/or prosecuted for espionage. A defector repudiates his or her country and comes forward to the enemy (walk-in) in possession of information of value. A defector-in-place is one who denounces their country but does not leave. In such cases, the person becomes a "mole", remaining in place where they can funnel information of value.
DISINFORMATION -- The creation and dissemination of false information to injure a target. A typical practice would involve forging false documents and leaking copies to the press, for example. Another technique would involve using scientifically produced propaganda to influence citizens under the spell of another power. In times of war, disinformation consists of leaking false war plans and the like.
DOUBLE AGENT -- Anyone working for more than one intelligence service, providing information or disinformation about each agency to the other.
HONEY TRAP -- A term used to describe the use of sex to blackmail or pressure someone into participating in an intelligence operation, or create a situation in which the target can be blackmailed at a later time. see Raven and Swallow.
ILLEGAL -- An agent performing intelligence work in a foreign country who passes him or herself off as not really a citizen of the country they are from; a standard recruitment ploy. Also, a term for anyone under deep cover of a legend.
INFORMER -- A person who knowingly or unknowingly provides information or intelligence.
MOLE -- A high-level agent who is hidden within an enemy organization who normally only provides information or intelligence in cases where it would be extremely valuable.
PRODUCT -- The final result of an intelligence analysis produced for the consumer or user; may be oral, written, or graphic.
RATFUCKER -- A term used to describe an infiltrator who has been planted in an organization.
RAVEN -- Name for a male agent used to seduce females or other males.
SLEEPER -- A technique used (extensively by the Germans and Russians) by intelligence services to plant an immigrant into a foreign country, and then activate him or her at a later time when needed.
SUCKING DRY -- A term (originally Russian in origin) to describe the process of debriefing an agent after he or she comes home from a mission.
SWALLOW -- Name for a female agent used to seduce men or other females.
TURN -- Turning somebody is to transform an agent into a double agent. The most common methods are: threat of execution; and blackmail, often involving sex. Sometimes, patriotism and money are used.
WET WORK -- A term used to describe intelligence operations involving murder or assassination.
SEXUAL AND NONSEXUAL COMPROMISES

Getting past the extensive folklore on this subject is necessary. Sex is only one (1) of several methods for turning someone into a traitor or spy. Almost all the motives for becoming such a person are expressed in the acronym MICE (Money, Ideology, Compromise, Ego). Sex falls under the Compromise category. The letter "C" (for Compromise) can itself be subdivided into three (3) distinct subparts:

Heterosexual Compromise
Homosexual Compromise
Nonsexual Compromise
The theory behind the use of sex in espionage is based mostly on Freudian theory, the idea that the sex drive is basic, so basic, in fact, that it is the basis of all other drives, a generalized drive, if you will. Additionally, the sex drive is compulsive or addictive. It cuts across various degrees of mental intellect. There are several known incidents in which powerful and intelligent people have jeopardized their careers to satisfy a sexual urge or craving. The use of beautiful women in baited situations is known as planting a "honey trap", or more formally "entrapment," but sometimes a good-looking man (or romeo) is planted. The Arab countries are said to know everything about NATO activities and plans because it has been so efficiently penetrated by Arab romeos. A rather interesting part of spy history involves the use of HOMOSEXUAL agents. Some of the most notorious spies in history have been homosexuals (the Cambridge Spy Ring) or sexual deviants (the KGB agent Geoffrey Prime). Most sexual deviants don't succeed in the spy business, but homosexuals apparently do. Instead of being called "honey-traps," a homosexual compromise situation is called a "drone-traps."

Recruits are also often enticed into various "deals" which expose them to blackmail by the host country's intelligence services. Here's a list of various techniques:

Black-marketing -- targets are threatened with exposure for buying contraband goods and services on the black market.

Currency violations -- targets are threatened with exposure for violating currency laws of the host nation

Security violations -- targets are threatened with exposure for violating "no trespassing" zones or being on government property of the host nation

Criminal Law violations -- targets are threatened with prosecution for various criminal offenses that they have been setup in.

Any refugee or war criminal makes excellent material for recruitment. The immigration quota system is often used to threaten people. An applicant is converted into a spy by promises of moving quickly on their visa application (permission to leave the country) in return for agreeing to spy in their newly adopted countries. Some nations offer to pay all tuition expenses if the student, studying in the host country, agrees to engage in espionage.

Job titles come in many forms. At the top of the hierarchy are officers in the various intelligence agencies. An intelligence officer position is usually an executive position, which means they get to stay home at headquarters most of the time. Underneath this career level are junior officers who are known as legals or illegals. A legal junior officer is one sent overseas under cover as a diplomat or attache. Illegal junior officers have more deceptive covers, usually as a business or sales person. Among the junior officer ranks, there is usually one spy master, who acts as the head controller. Almost all junior officers stationed abroad serve as case officers, or controllers. They are expected to recruit and run agents who come from the host country, setting up what is known as "assets," or a spy ring. The people who work in various supporting capacities at the home office are called analysts.

The persons recruited in the host country to work as assets, spies, or traitors are called agents. One of the defining characteristics of all agents is that they're expendable. There are different types of agents: penetration agents, or moles, who work under deep cover and are well-placed; double agents, who work for both sides; cut-outs, who act as intermediaries or mercenaries; feedback agents, who provide running commentary on political events, and may consist of stay-behinds, which are those left in place by retreating troops in wartime; and all-purpose agents of influence, who are provided with little direction and operate fairly independently.

Advocates of HUMINT (Human Intelligence) believe that, despite technological advances, traditional espionage remains crucial in providing information known as the foreknowledge before something takes place; i.e., information about intentions, political activity and strategic concepts of an adversary's leadership. Moreover, taking into consideration the current threat the world is faced, terrorism, where targets have gotten smaller, more mobile and have gone underground, the human intelligence platform becomes more important as well. There are advantages and disadvantages inherent with use of Official Cover (diplomat or any government official posted abroad) operatives and Nonofficial Cover (business, journalist, tourist) operatives, and the following chart details those matters:

Types of Intelligence Officers: Pros & Cons

Official Cover Nonofficial Cover
Advantages:

Diplomatic immunity
improved access to some potential sources i.e. "innocent" opportunities to meet host government officials and other diplomats
matter handled by an intelligence professional in case sensitive materials reach embassy
certain administrative convenience i.e. remuneration and other personnel issues
Access to a different, wider spectrum of potential sources
pose/be as nationals of the country posted to
facilitated in making contacts with potential sources
continuance of operations in case of diplomatic breakoff
harder for the host government to identify
Disadvantages:

Greater chances for counterintelligence service to find out the intelligence officer
hinder access to others who might be hesitant to deal with foreign officials
disruption of operations/networks in case of diplomatic breakoff
Expense and administrative difficulty
devotion of greater time to cover activity rather than on intelligence collection
communications difficult
Tradecraft prevails in intelligence collection when human assets are involved. No misinterpretation should be made about it: espionage is spying, period. To historians, it's the world's second oldest profession. To criminologists, it's a crime against government. To practitioners, it’s the exercise of tradecraft in the Great Game. Tradecraft is any technique or trick that substantiates a view of the work as a skilled occupation or craft. The most common operational skills for espionage work involve surveillance and running agents. At the barest minimum, there are only three basic requirements of an espionage operation: (1) a way for the agent to get a hold of someone in case of emergency; (2) a way for the intelligence officer to get information from the agent; and (3) a way to pay the agent. Those who do the actual spying are called agents. Their supervisors are called officers.

Spying is not considered a crime against government by the government that employs them, only by the government upon which they're spying. If the spy is a double agent or spies against their own country, then they're guilty of treason or being a traitor. Treason is a rather loose word that involves aiding or abetting your country's enemies, and is often tossed around with cases of ideological dissent or protest. Spies are always at risk of becoming traitors. In the U.S., the crime of espionage is covered by Title 18, Chapter 37, Sections 792-799 of the U.S. Code, and includes the following offenses:

Harboring or concealing an enemy of the United States
Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information
Gathering or delivering defense information to aid a foreign government
Photographing or sketching defense installations
Using aircraft to photograph defense installations
Publication or sale of photographs of defense installations
Disclosure of classified information
Violation of Intelligence Community regulations
One of the most frequently cited definitions of espionage is "the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation" (Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive). However, there are other meanings, especially when one considers the long history of espionage in world affairs, but even with just the American experience, there are historical lessons to be learned.

American history traces spying to the American Revolution. George Washington, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay directed a broad range of clandestine operations that helped the colonies win independence. They ran networks of agents and double agents, employed deceptions against the British army, launched sabotage operations and paramilitary raids, used codes and ciphers, and disseminated propaganda and disinformation to influence foreign governments. America's founders all agreed with General Washington that "the necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be further argued." Nathan Hale, of course, was America's most famous spy, and everyone knows his famous quote in 1776 when he was about to be hanged: "I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country." Washington's first State of the Union message requested that Congress establish a "secret service fund" for clandestine activities. Within two years, the fund represented over ten percent of the federal budget. Thomas Jefferson drew on it to finance the US war on the Barbary Pirate states in 1804-05. James Madison employed espionage against Spain during 1810-12. President James K. Polk dealt with the Turks during his administration, coming up with the famous line, rebuffing his critics, saying "The experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary ... to make expenditures, the very object of which would be defeated by publicity" (The Polk Doctrine). Both sides in the Civil War employed espionage. The North's principal spymasters were Allen Pinkerton and Lafayette Baker--as well as military officers George Sharpe and Grenville Dodge. The Confederacy had a loose array of secret services, and three of the South's most celebrated agents were women--Rose Greenhow, Belle Boyd, and Antonia Ford. Overall, the North was more effective at espionage and counterintelligence, while the South had more success at covert action.

America's first formal, permanent intelligence organizations were formed in the 1880s: the Office of Naval Intelligence (the oldest, established in 1882) and the Army Military Intelligence Division. They posted attachés in several major European cities principally for open-source collection. When the Spanish-American War broke out in 1898, the attachés switched to espionage. During World War I, the US State Department got involved in espionage, and the most significant advance for U.S. intelligence during the war was the establishment of a permanent communications security (COMSEC) agency in the Army-the forerunner of the National Security Agency. Meanwhile, psychological warfare started to emerge as a phenomenon. The Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation (forerunner of the FBI) took on a counterintelligence role as early as 1916, and Congress passed the first federal espionage law in 1917. Between wars, America tried to follow Secretary of State Henry Stimson's dictum that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail," but by 1941, the United States had built a world class military intelligence capability, consisting of the "Black Chamber", or Section 8 (Cryptography) of Military Intelligence, under Herbert Yardley (Black Chamber being an old French phrase for any government agency that opens and reads mail), the Army's Signal Intelligence Service (SIS which later became the 2nd Signal Service Battalion), and several Navy Intelligence Agencies (a cryptography unit and a photography interpretation unit were the most prominent additions to ONI).

World War II saw America's first peacetime, civilian intelligence agency--the Office of the Coordinator of Information--to organize the activities of several agencies. It grew into a larger and more diversified intelligence agency by 1942, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), forerunner to the CIA. The OSS (sometimes referred to as Oh So Secret) contained a number of famous Americans like Allen Dulles, Arthur Schlesinger, Arthur Goldberg, Gene Fodor (originator of the Fudor guides to foreign countries), filmmaker John Ford, and cookbook author Julia Childs. The OSS set up offices around the world and recruited networks of agents, and soon began participating in joint military operations. The OSS officially became the CIA in 1947. From the beginning, the CIA was resented by military intelligence, the FBI, and the press. It was dubbed a "Super Gestapo" agency with vaguely worded authorization. Fairly quickly, the CIA got its officers into "attache" positions at embassies around the world, but then, along with assistance from the military, took an interest in photo reconnaissance as well as intercept operations, and soon were controlling secret flights. By 1951, the CIA was an intel model agency for the world. Everyone was convinced they needed to consolidate intelligence into one agency like the U.S., but since at least 1991, there has been incessant restructuring of America's spy agencies.

CONTROVERSIAL METHODS OF COLLECTION

Torture and/or Brainwashing: A common technique is to capture and "turn" an enemy into one of your agents. This isn't as relied upon as it once was, but torture and interrogation designed to do this have a somewhat respectable place in intelligence work, and it normally can't go on in a constitutional democracy, so rendition, or transfer of the prisoner to another country usually occurs. All sorts of techniques have been found to work so "torture" is perhaps not the best word to describe it. For example, one can irritate a person with flashing lights at 85 cycles per minute which puts them in a receptive state to believe anything. Certain heavy metal music has somewhat the same effect. The study of slightly irritating things that rob you of your sense of control or self-confidence is the true study of torture and brainwashing. Tough, physical methods are not necessary, and you've lost or given up if you rely on third-degree tactics. In fact, you don't want to use pain because the subject will lie and tell you anything to make the pain stop, and their subconscious will commingle fact and fiction. Instead, a regimen of psychological pressure or coercion is better. In the end, you want to completely destroy the subject's psyche, turn their mind upside-down, and win their cooperation freely and voluntary. This has been the standard way of interrogating captured terrorists for years. There's no need for a good cop, bad cop routine. It's important all the interrogators be perceived as good.

Torture is, of course, prohibited by international law (see Lecture on Handling Illegal Enemy Combatants), but psychological coercion is not. Where the two cross over is anyone's guess, but I would imagine marathon interrogations, lasting two, three, or four days in length, are good examples of a crossover situation. However, a lot can be accomplished in less than a 48 hour period, if done right. To begin with, a captured subject is blindfolded, and driven or flown around at length (even if the interrogation site is nearby). The use of truth serum is not strictly prohibited by international law, but also effective is giving somebody a placebo, and letting them believe it's a truth serum. Subjects are usually placed in a small cell (5' by 7'), surrounded by bright lights (sometimes flashing), and music or static is played over speakers. The conditions of the cell are usually cold and wet. These conditions take away the ability to reason properly. They are awakened and fed at irregular intervals to throw off their biological clock. Then, they are constantly told lies that their family and friends need them to cooperate. It should become clear to the subject that any talking, along lines that the interrogators want to hear, helps to alleviate some of these conditions. In return for talking, the lights or static may be dimmed, for example. Dry clothes and uninterrupted sleep may follow as further rewards. It's simply the stuff of behavioral modification that one might find in a correctional rehabilitation textbook.

Once the subject has started cooperating, you build them back up by restoring their sense of self. This sense of self-reference must always include at least one of the interrogators as a central figure, perhaps based on promises you'll watch out for them, take care of them, and look after them from now on. The goal is to create a Stockholm syndrome where the subject identifies and becomes loyal to the interrogators. Brainwashing is the political indoctrination and ideological conditioning of people held captive with the purpose of changing their loyalties. It has been used on captured civilians and servicemen in the hope of making them traitors. There are believed to be three (3) stages:

Stage 1 -- produce chaos, distrust, & turmoil in the individual

Stage 2 -- eradicate individualism, self-will & creativeness

Stage 3 -- inculcate the foreign ideology & dogma to realign loyalty

Brainwashing is based on the theory that every person has its breaking point. Brainwashing is not the correct term to use, as the current politically correct (and more sociological) term is "coercive persuasion" or "social persuasion." People who have been brainwashed apparently do not realize it, and will usually passionately deny it. At best, they will admit to having "seen the light" in some miraculous way. The "miracle" analogy is appropriate because the concept of "conversion" in some religions is kind of like a brainwashing process. Similar techniques are used by human-potential trainers and in company retreats or training functions. High school pep rallies share some characteristics of brainwashing. The boot camp experience in military and law enforcement training is, to some degree, a type of brainwashing. Many diet programs use brainwashing techniques. Training in terrorist and criminal groups often involves brainwashing.

Repetitive music is the fastest way to produce an alpha state (an eyes-open altered state of consciousness in which people are 25 times more suggestible). There's no need for subliminal messages, just a rhythm close to the beat of the human heart, from 45 to 72 beats per minute. Words delivered at a rate of 45 to 60 beats per minute best accompany the suggestibility effect. People are more susceptible to brainwashing when they are cut off from the outside world, have to use bathroom facilities but are not allowed to, and have been deprived of food, sleep, drugs, tobacco, and caffeine. During brainwashing, the tone of human interaction must be deadly serious. Humor is only allowed, if at all, in Phase 3. Marching, chanting, and singing can produce suggestibility states, and it helps to demonize an enemy. The theory of how to demonize an enemy is to produce visual, creative images that access the RIGHT BRAIN. The left brain is too rational, so it's important to be creative and imaginative when demonizing. Brainwashing works best if the new enemy is an old friend, even somebody they once loved. This is easily seen with parental alienation syndrome, or the hate training that goes on when an ex-wife or ex-girlfriend brainwashes the children. Brainwashing is commonly engaged in by husbands against their wives in domestic violence situations.

The CIA has conducted secret experiments on brainwashing. One declassified paper written by L.E. Hinkle and H.E. Wolff (among other sources; see this online syllabus for a list of books) supports the notion that the effects of brainwashing are only temporary. No one has ever perfected the art of brainwashing to produce lifelong, consistent behavior change. Some critics would say that brainwashing doesn't work, that what actually occurs is that the followers eventually form a new collective world-view. Legally, a brainwashing, or more accurately, "duress" defense exists at law. The famous lawyer, F. Lee Bailey tried it in the Patty Hearst case, but the jury wouldn't buy it. President Carter, however, commuted her sentence, and President Clinton granted her a pardon. The vast majority of brainwashing cases are civil, and consist of former cult members suing their former groups for torts of false imprisonment, emotional distress, or fraud. Professional "deprogrammers" exist and have helped win multimillion-dollar verdicts in the 1980's. The watershed case is U.S. v. Fishman 743F.Supp. 713 (N.D.Cal. 1990), which in some ways, attempted to eliminate brainwashing testimony from law. While possibly outdated, the most intensive and classic work on the subject is the 1960's research on POWs by Shein and Lifton (1961). According to Lifton (1961), the requirements for a really clean brainwash are:

isolation of subjects
control over their information
debilitation
degradation
discipline and fear
peer pressure
performance of repetitive tasks
renunciation of formerly held values
MIND CONTROL EXPERIMENTS

Experiments have been conducted on mind control using drugs. The most secretive project is code name MKULTRA where MK stands for Mind Killer, although there have been other suggestions about what it stands for. This program ran from 1953 to 1963. The Soviets had been putting spies on the stand and getting them to confess openly, so the U.S. wanted to develop a similar "truth serum" as well as come up with a way for captured agents to induce amnesia. American spies carried a deadly fish toxin to take in case of capture, but the CIA wanted something better. They experimented with LSD. Sidney Gottlieb, who managed the CIA's Technical Services Division, supervised the experiments in mind control (code name Operation Midnight Climax in San Francisco). Gottlieb played a crucial role in the death of Dr. Frank Olson, who worked for the US Army's biological weapons center at Fort Detrick. In 1953, Gottlieb gave the unwitting Olson some LSD, and Olson soon developed psychotic symptoms and jumped to his death from a hotel window. Gottlieb was also implicated with Harry Anslinger's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and the infamous Dr Ewen Cameron, a Canadien who experimented with electroshock and lobotomies (see Lecture on Classic Modern Drug Propaganda). Cameron invented a particularly ghastly process called "psychic driving" whereby drugged and shocked patients would have tapes played sixteen hours a day, dictating their new personalities. Gottlieb also funded experiments by Dr. Harris Isbell at the Center for Addiction Research in Lexington, Kentucky. This center experimented on black heroin addicts, the most infamous experiment being when Isbell gave LSD to seven black men for seventy-seven straight days.

Besides psychotropic drugs like LSD and psilocybin, certain biotoxins intended to disable or kill have been used in national security work. The CIA has been implicated in little black bag jobs in the Congo, Iraq, and of course, with the endless poisons directed at Fidel Castro. There were also some less-than-honorable things done under the Operation Phoenix Program in Vietnam, such as prisoner experimentation. The Canadians were also involved in prisoner experimentation. In Canada, the most infamous prison doctor was George Scott, who served as director of the Canadian Army's psychological rehabilitation department during World War II. After the war, Scott teamed up with shrinks from Allan Memorial Institute, including the notorious Ewen Cameron, to launch a variety of drug, electroshock, sensory deprivation and pain tolerance experiments, using prisoners and patients at mental hospitals as guinea pigs. One of those patient was John Stanley Faulder, who in 1977 went on a killing spree after being "rehabilitated." Other famous victims of these Canadian experiments were Robert Renaud and Dorothy Proctor, each of whom has sued the Canadian government. By far, however, the most famous name in the history of mind control experiments is Timothy Leary, who's colorful career began as a research psychologist at the Kaiser Foundation, where he developed a personality test to help the authorities classify prisoners, and from there, Leary went on to become a lecturer at Harvard. The "Leary Personality Test," as it was known, had attracted the attention of the chairman of the Dept. of Social Relations, Dr. Henry Murray, whose also experimented on Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber. Murray's "Thematic Aptitude Test" was being used by the CIA, which then took up the "Leary Test." Ted Kaczynski was a student volunteer in the contracts that Harvard had with the Pentagon and CIA. Leary then went on to the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in Concord, and embarked on LSD and psilocybin experiments with prisoners as possible means for behavior modification. From there, Leary somehow managed to wind up in the country of Algeria, where Eldridge Cleaver, exiled information minister of the Black Panthers, had him put in jail, but the CIA helped spring Leary from jail.

THE USE OF PSYCHICS

Psychics have been used by intelligence agencies. Psychic espionage refers to information obtained by paranormal means through extrasensory perception (ESP) or the use of psychic powers. The U.S. Intelligence Community (primarily the DIA) during the 1980s and early 1990s, spent millions of dollars investigating the feasibility of using psychics and the technique of remote viewing (see Ed Dames website for the technical details of how to do remote viewing). Code-named Star Gate, the 10-year project was inspired by reports that the Soviets were using similar techniques, and reviews of the project (e.g., Smith 2005) indicated that psychic perceptions did exist, but the problem lied in the reliability of interpreting those psychic perceptions. Some police departments have long used psychics since the Jack the Ripper case, and in more modern times, with renowned psychic Jeanne Dixon and her prediction of the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963. The 2004 movie Suspect Zero also portrayed remote viewers helping the FBI catch serial killers. Psychics have actually played a somewhat extensive role with crime fighting and national security. Some psychics use crystals in their investigations because they are believed to possess energies that are attuned with the paranormal world. Another technique typically found in law enforcement is dowsing, which is usually done with a pendulum over a map to locate missing people or objects. Different objects are used in dowsing, with some psychics preferring metal rods and others using wooden sticks like someone searching for water or oil. Some psychics believe the accuracy of their information depends upon how understandable their spirit guide is, and often, this spirit guide is one of the victims of a murderer or someone who died with knowledge of the crime. A few psychics claim that a giant record of all the deceased exists in the netherworld, and it's all a matter of looking someone up. Visionary dreams are another source of psychic information, and these appear to be somewhat useful for geographic locations, like the site of a plane crash or what a catastrophe scene looks like. The term psychometrics is used by psychics for when something the victim owned, such as an article of clothing, is contacted (usually held to the forehead), and information about the owner is "sensed" from contact with that object. The famous psychic Uri Geller, who operated in the 1970s and 1980s became rich and famous for his ability to sense where undiscovered oil, coal, and diamond fields were located. Dorothy Allison assisted police with the Patty Hearst kidnapping in 1974 and the arrest of the Son of Sam in 1977. Renie Wiley established a police training school in Florida during the 1980s to train local police on how to work with psychics. Since the early 1990s, a group in California, calling themselves the Mobius group, consists of a team of 25 psychics who are ready to work on cases when called by the police. Psychic Michael Bromley, who has based his methods on Native American shamanism, has also been helping many police departments since the 1990s, especially with security at Olympic games.

Several American psychics were recruited and assigned to NSA headquarters in Ft. Meade in a joint NSA-CIA operation. The U.S. Navy also experimented with ship-to-shore telepathy using psychics stationed on submarines and ashore. There were some successes reported, such as the ability of psychics to predict the exact date of launchings of new enemy submarines and their missile complements. The DEA also reportedly took an interest in the program because it provided valuable information about drug trafficking routes. Despite these modest successes, the CIA shut down the program in 1995 after it was evaluated by outside consultants. The report by consultants was almost entirely negative. In recent years, several psychics who allegedly were involved in these programs have come forward to tell their stories. Gerald O'Donnell (who maintains one of the websites listed below) claims to have worked for a European intelligence service. Perhaps the most well-known former-CIA psychic is David Morehouse (1998), author of the book Psychic Warrior: Inside the CIA's Secret Program. According to Morehouse, Operation Star Gate was part of much larger remote viewing experiments. The most secretive activity was Operation Grill Flame, which was at Ft. Meade and involved recruiting military volunteers to have their psychic powers tested. The tests of Operation Grill Flame involved hooking soldiers up to biofeedback devices and monitors to determine if they could "see" the contents of what's inside an envelope.

Apparently, seven soldiers out of a thousand test positive as psychics. These soldiers were called "viewers" and each of them was assigned a "monitor" or person that handled them. At first, the CIA used them for fairly passive things like getting inside the minds of foreign scientists or military leaders. In the initial stages, the CIA also took an interest in the ability of viewers to transcend time as well as space (apparently, remote viewing involves seeing the past as well as the future). Soon, however, the CIA required viewers to see things from the eyes of hostages being tortured or airline bombing victims on their way to a fiery crash. As can be expected, these horrific scenes had a mental deteriorative effect on the psychics. Many of the CIA's psychics needed counseling or therapy to keep up with the stress of their workload. Toward the end, the CIA tried getting the psychics to use their powers as weapons, to assassinate people from abroad and so forth. That was when almost all the psychics quit. Some of them tried to blow the whistle to Congress, but the whole matter was kept out of the news and the program was quickly shut down.

One can see the range of efforts that have been undertaken to make human, clandestine intelligence gathering more effective and efficient. Much of it has been unsavory and surrounded in folklore, but that is the history of it. HUMINT, or human intelligence, basically involves espionage activities, and it is a fact that enemy spies and enemy secrets have to be dealt with in human ways. Given the sorry history of trying to make HUMINT more sophisticated, it is understandable that many agencies have sought to reduce their dependence on such sources, and turned to technical intelligence collection or open source exploitation. The dilemma will remain that there is no good substitute for an aggressive human intelligence collection system, but the problem is creating one in a manner consistent with constitutional principles that don't harm people.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, COVERT ACTION, AND COLLECTION

It is in the nature of counterintelligence that you never quite know what you're doing. This can make it appear silly or childish. Outsiders sometimes suggest that the melodramatic intrigue of the intelligence business be junked entirely; but even if all the spies were let go, and all the field stations closed down, counterintelligence would necessarily remain, for reason that a vulnerable intelligence service is worse than none at all. Once that point has been conceded, all the rest of the clandestine enterprise comes tumbling after, because the best way to protect one's service is to penetrate the enemy's. The game of espionage will always go on because even allies will spy upon another, not just enemies. Counterintelligence (CI) is discussed fully under the Lecture on Counterintelligence and involves any effort to protect secrets, prevent an intelligence mechanism from being manipulated, and also exploit the intelligence activities of another entity. It can be passive or active. Passive or defensive counterintelligence is called "security", and involves locating, screening, and identifying people, limiting their access to classified material, and instituting accounting systems to trace losses. Active counterintelligence is called "countermeasures", and involves specific protections using specific tactics such as neutralizing an enemy or putting them under surveillance.

Covert action (operation) can be defined as anything falling between the extremes of diplomacy and war. All covert action requires counterintelligence for protection. Counterintelligence also involves protection against assassination, kidnapping, espionage, and sabotage. Espionage, also called spying or running agents, involves access, infiltration, and penetration, and is probably best seen as a type of reconnaissance. Counterespionage is sometimes treated as synonymous with counterintelligence, but it is somewhat different in that the former is more aggressive. Counterespionage is primarily concerned with deception (sometimes called deception and denial) and counterintelligence is primarily concerned with monitoring. For example, counterespionage would try to stage fake accidents in which fake classified documents would fall into the hands of the enemy (in order to deceive them). It relies upon the skills of camouflage and forgery. Counterintelligence would normally try to keep the enemy's regular communication unaltered (for monitoring) to stay one step ahead of them, and to expose potential vulnerabilities that may be exploited later on. Counterintelligence produces some of the most confusing disinformation in the world, and several nations play that game well, regularly producing a steady stream of deception that is allowed to be intercepted. The U.S., of course, is the leader at this (mainly thru leaks to the press), but it's interesting to look at how other nations do it, which often involves their police agencies.

Covert action has generally not been a good friend of collection [see Lecture on Covert Action] since it not always impossible (in today's world especially) to trace an activity back to its sponsoring intelligence agency or "source." There is quite a bit of literature available on this topic, much of it critical and questioning whether covert action should be a standard part of foreign policy or is an nonessential element of intelligence operations. Defenders of the need for covert action argue that it provides an intermediate step between failed diplomacy and outright war. Current law (the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) requires that the President deem any proposed covert action as important to national security. Godson (1994) probably has the most popular book on the subject, although he combines covert action and counterintelligence, two very different intelligence disciplines. Covert action has been practiced by all Presidents, from Washington to Lincoln (Knott 1996). According to a 1948 National Security Council document, covert operations are defined as: "propaganda, economic warfare, preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation; and subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world." Numerous examples of famous covert actions abound, such as: (1) OPERATION AJAX (preserve the reign of the SHAH OF IRAN) - where things backfired; (2) PANAMA - where Noriega's involvement with drug dealers proved problematic; (3) BAY OF PIGS - where attempts to overthrow Castro failed and the subsequent Operation Mongoose was also a failure; (4) CHILE - where attempts to stop the Allende regime from coming to power backfired so bad a coup resulted; (5) MUNICH WORLD GAMES (GERMANY) - where secret hit squads were used; (6) AFGHANISTAN - pre-US KGB-led operations which were blatant examples of "wet affairs." It is possible to learn many lessons from studying intelligence failures and successes.

Famous Intelligence Failures: One of the most well-known failures was OPERATION BARBAROSSA, a deep penetration mission that took Russian intelligence by surprise. In 1941, Hitler staged an operation invading Russia with 3 million German troops who poured in from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea. The Russians had plenty of information about troop movements eastward by the Germans, and couldn't help but notice the increased number of aerial surveillance flights Hitler was sending over Russia. Besides, U.S. intelligence had already told Russian intelligence of Hitler's plans to invade Russia back in 1940. Russia was convinced that similar intelligence leaked to them by the British was really counterintelligence. Hitler played two deception schemes. He first explained the buildup of his troops on the Russian border as being there for training purposes, to prepare for the invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion). He then explained them as being contingency forces against possible hostile Soviet action. Stalin bought all this because his own intelligence led him to believe that Hitler would not dare try to fight a war on two fronts. This case is instructive because it details the problems associated with sharing intelligence and counterintelligence.

Another famous failure was PEARL HARBOR, again in 1941, when a task force of 33 Japanese ships stationed themselves 200 miles north of Oahu and launched two successive waves of air attack (350 planes). By the time the attack was over, the U.S. had lost 18 warships, 200 airplanes, and over 2,000 personnel. The case of Pearl Harbor is regarded as the worst case of intelligence failure in history. No intelligence agency had prepared a report for the possibility of an attack there, although everyone talked about it. Naval intelligence (ONI) did not even have a minimal amount of strategic or tactical intelligence. They thought Japan would attack Thailand about that time of year. The problem was that America lacked Human Intelligence (HUMINT) on Japan. The U.S. had a few geisha girls on the payroll, but no agents in the Japanese elite. The U.S. had broken the Japanese code, but what they were intercepting was just diplomatic and espionage information (movement of spies), nothing of the nature of military plans, and anyway, they changed their codes a day before the attack. Japanese radio transmissions deceived the Americans into thinking the task force was assembling for training maneuvers. This case stands as a testimony to the need for collecting human intelligence, and not relying upon technology so much.

Famous Intelligence Successes: In 1962, photographs from U-2 overflights had been monitoring the military buildup in Cuba, and to the United States, the difference between defensive weapons and offensive ones was a dramatic one. Soviet ships had been arriving at night, unloading big cargo, and leaving behind troops. Specifically, the Cubans were assembling IRBMs (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles). The incident was known as the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 15-28, 1962), and it showcased the best of American technology: NSA intercept; photo reconnaissance; and intelligence analysis. The CIA produced several reports, all along the lines of titles like "The Military Buildup in Cuba". HUMINT was also coming in regarding Soviet ships headed for Cuba, and the size of the missiles being installed. The eighty-foot long missiles were identified as SS-5s by American intelligence, and from photo interpretation, it could be seen that two sites were already operational and could carry 5 megaton warheads (although no nuclear warheads were identified, nuclear storage bunkers were). The CIA started producing reports entitled "Possible Soviet Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses of Action in Cuba", and a blockade was recommended. The Soviets were confronted in the world press about their activities, and Khrushchev and Kennedy squared off against one another with threats. Eventually, the Russians backed off, and removed all the missiles from Cuba. They even packed up the launch pads. Naval intelligence monitored the removal process. This case shows the effectiveness of intelligence agencies in a time of crisis.

In 1967, Israel started the SIX-DAY WAR, a battle with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Israeli intelligence predicted an attack by Egypt on Israel the next day, so the Israelis timed their attack to take place right before the Egyptian troops woke up that morning. It was a devastating blow, wiping out almost all of the Egyptian air force. Israeli intelligence based their hunch on the fact that Nasser had ordered the return of Egyptian forces from Yemen and the entire mobilization of the Egyptian military. Israeli ground forces secured the Sinai peninsula, and its air force also struck Jordanian and Syrian planes while they were still on the ground. The chief Israeli spy was Ali al-Atfi, personal masseur to Nassar and his aide, Anwar Sadat. Because the Israelis had broken the Egyptian code, during the war they were able to issue false commands to Egyptian tanks, ordering them to circle around the desert harmlessly. In 1973, an Egyptian attack triggered the YOM KIPPUR WAR, a battle between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. It was a war that made extensive use of intelligence operations, most importantly the first use of satellite hookups to guide fighters to their targets, and the use of deceptive SIGINT by the Israelis to deceive the Soviets that the U.S. was ready to step in if the Russians intervened. Going back to 1968, one of the most famous cases of good intelligence analysis involved the Russian Invasion of Czechoslovakia. Russia typically installed so many bugging devices, wiretaps, and spies in their satellite countries that they could easily tell when it appeared likely that the communist leaders were about to lose faith. The Russians would then storm in with their tanks to reassure people that they were indeed a satellite nation. This pattern of control was used successfully by the Soviet Union for many years, keeping countries like Romania and Bulgaria in check. The only nation in which the CIA even thought about trying counterintelligence with this Russian pattern was in Albania.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES

Almost all nations operate schools, institutes, or academies to train their clandestive service personnel. In the late 19th and early 20th century, the largest known spy school in the world was operated by the German Secret Service in Berlin, itself a city that had always been an espionage hub (along with Munich and Hamburg). Germany is mentioned because important lessons can be learned by studying Nazi methods, both good and bad things. Briefly, Hitler’s rise to power from 1920-1933 had much to do with how he consolidated of Germany’s intelligence apparatus. He started out with a gang of street fighters and thugs (the SA – initials for Sturmbtielung – "storm detachment"), then an elite personal guard (the SS – initials for Schutzstaffel – "protection detachment"). An intelligence unit grew out of the SS (the SD – Sicherheitsdienst – "security service") with duties to discover the enemies of National Socialism. The SS was also a secret police and terror organization that ran concentration camps. Out of the SD grew an espionage unit (the RSHA – Reichssicherheitshauptant – Reich Security Organization) which infiltrated most of the world with a vast network of spies, agents, and informants. The RSHA worked closely with the Gestapo (acronym for Geheime Staatspolizei – secret state police), and was, in fact, organizationally under the RSHA, but since the RSHA was so involved overseas, the Gestapo acted with impunity at home. The RSHA operated two major spy schools, one in The Hague and one in Belgrade. The German military war machine also had intelligence units that worked with the SD, but these mostly involved expertise in cipher and coding. By contrast, RSHA agents were trained in topography, trigonometry, engineering, disguises, deception, and seduction.

Russia has its own history of spying going back to 1565 with Ivan the Terrible, it was the first country to respond to Germany by creating its own spy schools. The Russian intelligence apparatus consisted mainly of the NKVD, MVD, and KGB, who each ran their own spy schools. The NKVD (Narodnyy Komisariat Vnutrennnikh Del – People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) were Stalin’s secret police, and in many ways, the world’s most efficient internal security and repression agency. The NKVD was responsible for both domestic and foreign intelligence, and grew so large that it eventually took over the Gulag – a vast constellation of prison camps spread across the Soviet state. The MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) was the name given to the NKVD in 1946 after some of its foreign intelligence operations were spun off into Smersh (a "Death to Spies" agency), the MGB (Ministry of State Security – military counterespionage), and K1 (economic intelligence). The KGB (Committee for State Security) was established in 1954 to undertake any and all state security and foreign intelligence operations not assigned to another agency. Russian spy schools include the main one at Pushkin, near Moscow (which also trained terrorists), and the Military-Diplomatic Academy in Moscow itself which poses as a research university but is a KGB training school. All in all, there are dozens of Russian spy schools throughout Russia and the world.

England has deep roots in espionage, mostly in detection of treason, domestic surveillance, and cypher codes (in fact, the British Cypher School – GC&CS – Government Code & Cypher School – is well known as the birthplace of cryptography). Foreign espionage and British spying really had its start with the American Revolution (1775), and evolved rather haphazardly up to 1909 when two agencies were created in the Secret Service Bureau of the War Office. Those two agencies were the Home Section (called "MI5" for the fifth branch of Military Intelligence) and the Foreign Section (designated "MI6"). The MI5 became famous for its counterespionage successes (catching German spies), and today operates as a counterterrorism agency. The MI6 operates today by sending agents into foreign lands on dangerous missions. It is not known exactly where British spy schools are located, presumably on military bases.

The United States operates several formal spy schools. The CIA trains its agents at Camp Peary, Virginia, and the FBI at its academy in Quantico, Virginia. Both agencies use a variety of military schools, including the Polygraph School at Fort McClellan, Alabama as well as a number of other locations which should remain undisclosed. All branches of the military offer intelligence curricula at their respective war colleges, centers, institutes, and postgraduate schools. All military and non-military intelligence services make use of private educational institutes, like the Defense Language School in Monterey, California, for foreign language training. Many agency training school locations are classified, and secrecy also prevails when private contractors or vendors are used for collection work.

Private sector involvement with intelligence collection is perhaps the fastest-growing area of intelligence development. It's also not well-known, but there are number of corporations who can be hired to perform covert action as well as intelligence gathering. Such groups are seen as an alternative that is sometimes useful.